Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours of the Fixation Requirement in Copyright Law by Brown, Evan
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 3
7-1-2014
Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours of the
Fixation Requirement in Copyright Law
Evan Brown
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Evan Brown, Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours of the Fixation Requirement in Copyright Law, 10 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 17
(2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss1/3
WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS 
VOLUME 10, ISSUE 1 SUMMER 2014 
 
FIXED PERSPECTIVES:  
THE EVOLVING CONTOURS OF THE FIXATION 
REQUIREMENT IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
Evan Brown* 
© Evan Brown 
 
Cite as: 10 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 17 (2014) 
http://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1388 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
To qualify for copyright protection under the current 
Copyright Act, a work must, inter alia, be fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression. This requirement is easily met when 
a work is embodied in a historical medium of mass 
expression like a printed book, photograph, or audio 
recording. However, when an author departs from such 
established media of fixation, the requirement can create a 
more significant barrier to copyrightability. Three decades 
ago, digital media provided one such challenge. Today, 
authors and lawyers alike are pushing the conceptual 
boundaries of communicative media, and this has led to 
some controversial recent judicial decisions on fixation. 
This Article contextualizes and explores the implications of 
those decisions. It also points out some of the practical and 
conceptual pitfalls that lawyers and courts may encounter 
in similar cases as the limits of fixation are further tested. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Fixation is a key component of federal copyright law: it is what 
separates protectable from unprotectable original works of 
authorship. It is the reason why a novel utterance is not protected 
but a novel sound recording is. While copyright law creates 
intellectual property rights, the fixation requirement ensures that 
the intellectual property right can be tied to a physical object. To 
put it another way, an author’s work needs an avatar to qualify for 
protection. The process of fixation merges “original work and 
tangible object . . . in order to produce subject matter copyrightable 
under the [Copyright Act].”1 Only once this merger has occurred is 
a work properly copyrightable. 
Fixation is necessary because only fixed works are at risk of 
misappropriation by copying. Copyright law is grounded in the 
incentivization of artistic production, not mere creativity. As a 
matter of policy, copyright encourages making and distributing 
works that can communicate expression to others far and wide. Its 
imposition of limited monopoly rights is interest charged on the 
debt we owe to the printing press. The net effect of these 
1 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976). 
                                                                                                             
2
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss1/3
2014] THE EVOLVING CONTOURS OF THE 19 
FIXATION REQUIREMENT IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
requirements is familiar and fundamental to copyright law: an 
expression only constitutes a copyrightable work if it can be 
reproduced, performed, displayed, or distributed. Copyright 
protects things that can be copied, not things that can be imitated. 
The historically dominant media of mass expression are the 
progenitors of the fixation requirement: printed books and 
periodicals, paintings, photographs, film, and musical recordings 
are the sort of media that copyright law has long championed. 
There is a practical, if not a legal, presumption that works in these 
media are appropriately fixed. But more difficult cases have 
emerged in recent years as unusual media of expression have had 
their day in court. These cases bring to the forefront questions 
about which types of works copyright law encompasses. In 
considering these questions, we must also consider, as a policy 
matter, which types of works copyright should incentivize as 
creators test the boundaries of authorship and expression. 
 
I. THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT 
 
The fixation requirement is defined in 17 U.S.C. §102(a), 
which applies copyright protection to “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”2 Section 101 offers further insight: “A work is 
‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment . . 
. is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”3 By combining these provisions, the 
2 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
3 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added) (definition of “fixed”). The statute also 
requires that embodiment be in a “copy” or “phonorecord.” Copies are in turn 
defined as “material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed 
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device.” Id. (definition of “copies”). Phonorecords, on the 
other hand, are restricted to “material objects in which sounds, other than those 
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any 
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be 
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requirement seems reducible to four basic elements: (1) encoding 
of expression (2) in a physical medium (3) that can convey that 
expression to others (4) and can persist unaltered for some 
appreciable time. Notably, only the first of these elements involves 
creative activity by the author; the latter three are qualities of the 
medium in which the author encodes the expression. 
The fixation requirement can be satisfied in a number of 
situations. The author can make the material copy before the work 
is ever presented to an audience.4 The author can make the 
material copy while the work is first being presented to an 
audience.5 The author can even direct another person to make the 
first copy.6 In each case, the key is that the expression is preserved 
in some persistent communicative medium, some useable vehicle 
for later communication. This is what separates copyable (and thus 
potentially copyrightable) expression from uncopyable expression. 
 
A.  The Origins of Fixation 
 
For most of the history of copyright law, fixation has not been 
an issue. It was simply an undifferentiated part of the authorship 
process,7 while copyrightable subject matter was confined to rigid 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device.” Id. (definition of “phonorecords). These definitions 
accomplish little more than dividing acceptable media of fixation into (1) 
audible media and (2) all other media of expression. 
4 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “fixed”). 
5 Id. (“A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being 
transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being 
made simultaneously with its transmission.”); see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. 
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 675 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that simultaneous recording of a baseball game constitutes fixation of 
the players’ performances). 
6 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “fixed,” noting that fixation may be 
accomplished “by or under the authority of the author”); see also H. R. REP. NO. 
94-1476, at 51–2 (exploring fixation in the context of a directed broadcast). 
7 It was, in fact, Congress’s expansion of the concept of authorship that 
necessitated the fixation requirement. In refusing to confine authorship to certain 
categories of works, Congress chose to broaden the concept of a work. See H. R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–2. The fundamental qualities of the concept of a work, 
it seems, were human agency, expression, and fixation. Id. 
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categories rather than defined by flexible concepts and qualities. 
The first U.S. Copyright Act, enacted in 1790, applied quite 
specifically to maps, charts, and books only.8 Congress extended 
protection to musical compositions in 1831.9 In 1909, the list of 
categories was greatly expanded to include periodicals, prepared 
speeches, dramatic compositions, drawings, prints, photographs, 
and “works of art.”10 
Only when this periodic expansion seemed destined to continue 
ad infinitum did Congress attempt to craft a more flexible solution. 
This solution was to make the subject matter requirement 
dependent on the qualities of its creation rather than on the 
categorization of expressive products.11 While Congress did not 
abandon entirely the attempt to categorize works of authorship—
indeed, it expanded those categories yet again12—it chose not to 
confine copyright protection to its enumerated categories.13 
Suddenly, fixation mattered as a concept. 
The historical media of authorship all required fixation, and in 
an important way they defined the concept. They were media, but 
they were a particular kind of media. They were media that 
involved an encoding of expression in a durable physical form. 
They could be distributed, experienced, kept, and reused. Most 
importantly, they could be copied. Their value was intertwined 
with their vulnerability. Copyright law incentivized their creation 
by addressing the vulnerability while preserving the value. 
But as technology advanced and the panoply of expressive 
media expanded, a more fluid concept was required to keep pace. 
Recognizing that “[a]uthors are continually finding new ways of 
expressing themselves, [and] it is impossible to foresee the forms 
that these new expressive methods will take,” Congress added the 
fixation requirement as a sort of flexible gatekeeper for the 
8 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 § 1; see also H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 
at 51–2. 
9 Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436 chap. 16. 
10 Copyright Act of 1909, Public Law 60-349 § 5. 
11 See H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–2. 
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1–8). 
13 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include the following 
categories . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–2. 
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protection of new media.14 Yet, despite the flexibility afforded by 
trading fixed categories for their defining conceptual quality, new 
technology still managed to create confusion over copyrightability 
as the digital revolution began. 
 
B.  Fixation in the Digital Age 
 
Digital works presented two different problems for fixation, 
one of technological literacy and one of categorical 
characterization. Digital works appeared, at least to the untrained 
user, to be intangible by nature. Since copyrightability turned on 
whether an expressive medium was also a tangible medium, courts 
were called on to determine tangibility. At the same time, the 
emergence of interactive digital works—specifically, video games 
in their industrial infancy—challenged courts to assess what 
characteristics must be unchangeable to qualify as a fixed work. 
 
1. The Tangibility of Digital Works 
 
The question of tangibility was the simplest for the courts to 
answer. Despite a general lack of institutional competency with 
regard to new technologies, courts were able to arrive at a 
workable solution by analogy. At least one early court that 
considered the issue held that programs could not be fixed in 
computer memory, likening such memory to building plans.15 Yet 
the legislative history behind the Copyright Act showed that the 
development of computer programs and other digital works was a 
key impetus for the shift from categorical protection to the flexible 
fixation requirement.16 Taking this into account, courts began to 
look at the question more practically, and a consensus emerged 
that most memory media were adequate media of fixation.17 The 
14 See H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51. 
15 Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Grp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 n.4 
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (concluding in dictum that a computer program could not be 
fixed in memory because the memory was analogous to a playback device, not a 
tangible medium of expression). 
16 H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52. 
17 E.g., Tandy Corp. v. Pers. Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 
                                                                                                             
 
6
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss1/3
2014] THE EVOLVING CONTOURS OF THE 23 
FIXATION REQUIREMENT IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
key to these decisions was that humans could encode computer 
programs—which the courts agreed were works of authorship—
onto the memory for later playback. While computer memory 
operated in some sense as a playback device, it was the fact that it 
could store a work for playback that made it an acceptable medium 
of fixation. That made memory more similar to the historical 
media of fixation—the media of mass publication—than to a mere 
playback device. 
 
2. Interactivity and Fixation 
 
Interactivity proved somewhat more difficult, though courts 
again ended up in accord on the issue. In Williams Electronics, Inc. 
v. Artic Int'l, Inc., the Third Circuit considered whether an 
inherently changeable work could be fixed.18 The plaintiff in that 
case, the producer of the early video game Defender, sued a 
copycat producer for effectively replicating the game. Defender 
had two modes: the “play mode” and the “attract mode.” The latter 
consisted of a rotating series of set animations and sounds showing 
examples of what the game was like when played. The court had 
little difficulty concluding that this mode was fixed for purposes of 
copyright protection; while the presentations were generated anew 
from computer memory each time, they followed set patterns and 
therefore were always the same expression.19 The game code and 
art and music assets were the sort of “machine or device” 
contemplated by the § 101 fixation definition. 
The “play mode” at issue in Williams was more problematic 
because the actual order and arrangement of the audiovisual 
presentation depended on user input. When a user played the game, 
the arrangement of the art assets and the timing of animations and 
(N.D. Cal. 1981); Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.4 (2d 
Cir. 1982); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d 
Cir. 1982). 
18 685 F.2d at 870. 
19 Id. at 874 (emphasis added); accord Stern, 669 F.2d at 856 (“[M]any 
aspects of the sights and the sequence of their appearance remain constant 
during each play of the game. . . . The repetitive sequence of a substantial 
portion of the sights and sounds of the game qualifies for copyright protection as 
an audiovisual work.”). 
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sound playback would change according to player’s decisions and 
reactions. The actual course of the presentation was not fixed in the 
colloquial sense. Yet the court still held that the game satisfied the 
fixation requirement, since the player was interacting with 
copyrighted art and sound in set patterns determined by 
copyrighted instructions: 
Although there is player interaction with the 
machine during the play mode which causes the 
audiovisual presentation to change in some respects 
from one game to the next in response to the 
player's varying participation, there is always a 
repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the 
sights and sounds of the game, and many aspects of 
the display remain constant from game to game 
regardless of how the player operates the controls.20  
Essentially, the court held that the player’s “changes” were 
only to the manner of experiencing otherwise properly copyrighted 
elements. The game memory, code, and kit constituted a “device” 
that aided the player in experiencing these fixed elements. So long 
as the player could recreate the exact same inputs and timing 
(which was nearly impossible), the same patterns would occur. 
Even if exact reproduction did not occur, a “substantial portion” of 
the presentation remained the same. The game was therefore 
copyrightable, and the defendant was liable for copying it.  
This same principle arose from other leading cases examining 
the issue, and quickly became a widespread rule.21 Fixation was, 
generally speaking, no longer a barrier to the development of 
digital works and the massive industries they spawned. The new, 
flexible fixation requirement had passed its first big test. But that 
test was not to be its last. 
 
II. EMERGING BOUNDARIES TO MEDIA OF FIXATION 
 
In recent years, a different sort of threat to our understanding of 
20 Williams, 685 F.2d at 874. 
21 See Stern, 669 F.2d 852; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. 
Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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fixation has arisen. This threat is not technological, but conceptual. 
Two cases—one involving conceptual artistry and the other 
involving creative lawyering—have brought the fixation 
requirement back into the limelight. This nascent line of case law 
began with the controversial 2011 case Kelley v. Chicago Park 
District22 and was taken up later that year in the much less 
heralded case Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers.23 In Kelley, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided 
controversial but nuanced reasoning distinguishing media of 
fixation from media inherently ill-suited to fixation. In Kim Seng, a 
California district court then took that reasoning and extended it in 
an apparent attempt to simplify and apply it to qualitatively similar 
media. While it is unclear precisely what conclusions should be 
drawn from this emerging line of cases, or even whether the line 
will be built upon further, the cases mark a significant turn in 
fixation jurisprudence toward circumscribing media of fixation 
according to qualitative characteristics of those media. 
 
A.  Kelley v. Chicago Park District 
 
The beginnings of the new bounding of fixation began in 
Kelley.24 In that case, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a 
“living art” piece comprising arrangements of planted wildflowers 
was sufficiently fixed to allow for copyright protection. The artist, 
Chapman Kelley, was a well-known Texas painter and landscape 
artist who conceived of the arrangement as a public work of 
conceptual art. He installed it in 1984 in Chicago’s Grant Park and 
maintained it for years afterward. However, the wildflowers 
became overgrown and the Chicago Park District heavily modified 
the arrangement, reducing its size and altering its geometry. Kelley 
opposed the changes and ultimately sued the Park District under 
the new Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). VARA, which injects 
into the Copyright Act limited aspects of the moral rights (droit 
moral) that underlie much of European copyright law,25 gives an 
22 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).  
23 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
24 See 635 F.3d 290. 
25 VARA, codified at 17 U.S.C. §106A, implements a limited moral rights 
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artist the right to prevent modification of particular kinds of visual 
art, including sculptures. Kelley claimed that his “Wildflower 
Works” was a sculptural work, and thus subject to VARA. But to 
qualify as a sculpture, the work had to meet the general 
requirements for copyright protection as well.  
Fixation proved the primary hurdle to copyright protection of 
the work.26 Wildflowers were an unusual medium, one that needed 
continuous maintenance to achieve any real semblance of 
permanence. Kelley himself had described the concept for the 
piece as involving the “management” of living elements.27 This 
management was apparently important to the conceptual 
expression Kelley intended. Unfortunately, it was also fatal to 
copyrightability, as it challenged the boundaries of permanence 
and made the source of authorship unclear.  
The court found the concept of fixation to be fundamentally 
incompatible with the qualities of plant arrangements. “A garden's 
constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed. 
. . . [I]ts appearance is too inherently variable to supply a baseline 
for determining questions of copyright creation and 
infringement.”28 Essentially, the court found that, because plants 
are constantly growing, there is no point at which they can give 
rise to more than temporary, uncopyable images. The issue was 
with the very essence of the medium: 
Seeds and plants in a garden are naturally in a state 
of perpetual change; they germinate, grow, bloom, 
become dormant, and eventually die. This life cycle 
moves gradually, over days, weeks, and season to 
season . . . . The essence of a garden is its vitality, 
not its fixedness. It may endure from season to 
regime for well-known works of visual at in the United States. Kelley, 635 F.3d 
at 297. In 1988, the United States signed the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, but in several respects the country 
subsequently failed to comply with the treaty provisions. One such provision 
was protection of artists’ moral rights, protected by Article 6bis. Congress 
enacted VARA to bring U.S. copyright law into compliance. 
26 Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 304–05. 
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season, but its nature is one of dynamic change.29 
The court could find no point at which the plants could be 
considered appropriately fixed, as they were always changing. 
Something vital, something living, could not be fixed—the essence 
of living is growth and mortality, not permanence. 
Moreover, the court did not believe that a human could actually 
author a garden. The court described a garden as something a 
human could initiate and maintain, but not something that a human 
could actually create. The creative forces behind the wildflowers 
were not Kelley’s intellect and expressive act; they were the forces 
of nature, acting as they always do. “Most of what we see and 
experience in a garden—the colors, shapes, textures, and scents of 
the plants—originates in nature, not in the mind of the gardener.”30 
Because human expression is not what gives rise to the visual 
elements of the work, it is not an expressive work and is therefore 
not subject to copyright protection.  
Notably, the court did not disagree with Kelley about the 
expressive potential of wildflower arrangements. Instead, the 
conceptual rift between them was over whether that expression 
came via a medium, from artist to viewer, or directly from nature 
to viewer (with the “artist” confined at best to a curatorial role). 
The court juxtaposed planted gardens with landscape designs. Such 
designs, it noted, are copyrightable because they make the artist’s 
expression reproducible.31 A plant can grow on its own, but a 
drawn design cannot.  
The court implied that non-static expressive media can exist, 
but they must be sufficiently static to allow for reproduction and 
transmission of the author’s expression.32 The court noted, for 
example, that Alexander Calder’s continuously moving mobiles, 
animated by wind and other natural forces, were sufficiently fixed 
because the individual functional elements of the mobiles were 
“obviously fixed and stable.”33 Similarly, a Jeff Koons wire-frame 
29 Id. at 305. 
30 Id. at 304. 
31 Id. at 304–05. 
32 Id. at 305. 
33 Id. This example calls to mind the video game elements in Williams, 
individually fixed and functionally constrained by a set of rules authored by a 
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sculpture covered in living flowers was deemed likely 
copyrightable, as the frame should be enough to fix the 
expression.34 The operative question in the Seventh Circuit’s view 
is whether the work is “quintessentially a garden” (i.e., an 
“expression” of natural forces) or a work of art (i.e., a reproducible 
form of the author’s expression).35 Put another way, the court was 
concerned with whether nature or a human author produced the 
aesthetic elements of the work.  
Wild plants, according to the Kelley decision, could not be 
directed by a human author, and therefore they could not serve as a 
medium of fixation. The court made it clear that its decision was 
categorical and essential. It deemed “vitality”—and, by 
implication, its less popular conceptual companion, mortality—the 
operative quality of the medium.36 A proper medium of fixation, 
like the historical media of mass communication, would instead be 
characterized by “fixedness.”37 That is not to say that plants could 
not form a component of a copyrightable work, but such a work 
would have to be sufficiently fixed in another medium. This 
reasoning seemed to put a new gloss on Congress’s intentionally 
open-ended language, effectively limiting fixation to media (old 
and new) that were in essence neither unpredictably protean nor 
inescapably progressive.  
 
B.  Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers 
 
What was not clear in the wake of the Kelley ruling was 
whether courts might extend the holding to apply to other sorts of 
human creator. See Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 
874 (3d Cir. 1982). 
34 It is logical to believe that a court would find only the non-living 
elements of the latter work copyrightable, although the court here expressly 
declined to offer its opinion on the issue. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305–06. 
35 Id. at 306. 
36 Id. at 305. 
37 Id. The court thereby produced an odd sort of teleology of fixation: a 
unfixable seed becomes an unfixable tree, but in death (or severance) it becomes 
fixable wood—once dead, material that in life could not constitute a 
copyrightable work may be formed into any manner of sculptures, paintings, 
photographs, or books. 
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inherently non-static media. The Seventh Circuit focused so 
intently on the living essence of plants that its holding could rather 
easily be limited to planted gardens alone.38 But at least one court 
has taken the bait and extended the Kelley holding to all inherently 
perishable media. 
In Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, the U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of California had to decide whether an 
arrangement of food was copyrightable as a matter of law.39 The 
plaintiff, a maker of Vietnamese rice sticks, had asked its 
employee to arrange its rice sticks with some other traditional 
Vietnamese foods in a bowl in a traditional manner. An outside 
photographer then photographed the bowl, and the company used 
the picture on its packaging. Because it was unclear whether the 
company owned the copyright to the photograph, it claimed that 
the underlying arrangement was itself copyrighted, with the 
photograph constituting only a derivative work. 
The defendant moved for summary judgment on grounds that 
perishable food, like the living plants discussed by the Seventh 
Circuit in Kelley, was an inherently inadequate medium of fixation. 
The court extended Kelley, but in the process simplified its holding 
as well: 
Like a garden, which is “inherently changeable,” a 
bowl of perishable food will, by its terms, 
ultimately perish. Indeed, if the fact that the 
Wildflower Works garden reviving itself each year 
was not sufficient to establish its fixed nature, a 
bowl of food which, once it spoils is gone forever, 
cannot be considered “fixed” for the purposes of § 
101.40 
The court keyed in on the stability requirement mentioned in 
Kelley, seemingly holding that any physical form that deteriorates 
38 Indeed, the court seemed to stop just short of limiting its holding in this 
very way by favorably discussing the Koons wire-frame work. Kelley, 635 F.3d 
at 305–06. 
39 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (considering plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment). 
40 Kim Seng, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
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cannot be used to fix expression for copyright purposes. Where the 
Kelley court expressly declined to hold that physical 
impermanence necessarily conflicted with the “sufficient 
permanence” required by §101—indeed, it noted that “no medium 
of expression lasts forever”41—the Kim Seng court found 
perishability dispositive of the fixation issue.  
This extension was not made blindly. The court explained that 
“the purposes underlying the fixation requirement—to ‘ease[] 
problems of proof of creation and infringement’—apply with equal 
force to a garden and a bowl of perishable food.”42 The district 
court, situated in the Ninth Circuit, was under no obligation to 
follow Kelley; it looked to it only as persuasive authority. And 
unlike the Seventh Circuit, the district court looked past issues of 
authorship and agency in favor of the evidentiary value of the 
fixation requirement. In effect, the court held that because food 
could not remain stable long enough to be offered as evidence in 
the event of an infringement claim, it could not serve as a medium 
of fixed expression.  
By this logic, “sufficient permanence” necessarily entails 
sufficient stability to retain form and structure until the time of any 
likely trial. While the court stated quite clearly that food was 
inherently unfixable because it will “ultimately perish,” it could 
not have meant that any physical form subject to eventual 
deterioration cannot serve as a medium of fixation. Such a holding 
would render historical media, e.g. photographs and paintings, 
uncopyrightable because paint and ink will fade and discolor with 
exposure to the elements.43 This would also be true of sound 
recordings made on audio tape, which degrade over time,44 and 
might even extend to electronic memory media, which degrade 
41 Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305. 
42 Kim Seng, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
43 See, e.g., Preservation: Photographs, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.gov/preservation/formats/photographs.html (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2014). Yet the Kim Seng court even noted that a photograph is 
“obviously” an appropriate medium of fixation. Kim Seng, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 
1054 n.8. 
44 See generally Richard L. Hess, Tape Degradation Factors and 
Challenges in Predicting Tape Life, 34 ASS’N FOR RECORDED SOUND 
COLLECTIONS 240, 244–67 (2008). 
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steadily with use.45 In fact, if one takes a long enough view, no 
physical form is truly immune from deterioration. Thus, the key to 
understanding Kim Seng lies in its mention of evidentiary 
necessity, not its discussion of perishability.  
If evidentiary value is at issue, it would seem that the primary 
requirement for fixation would be that a medium be at least 
capable of maintaining communicative permanence for the term of 
copyright protection. Yet this finds surprisingly little support. The 
Kim Seng court cited to the treatise Patry on Copyright for the 
proposition that evidentiary necessity supported the fixation 
requirement.46 That treatise, in turn, cited to Douglas Lichtman’s 
2003 article Copyright as a Rule of Evidence.47 But Lichtman 
explained in that article that 
the modern requirement excludes only those cases 
where there never was any physical evidence of the 
claimed expression; it does not exclude cases where 
there was evidence at some point in time, but that 
evidence was later lost or destroyed. Stated another 
way, federal law requires that fixations survive for a 
period of “more than transitory duration,” but it 
does not require that fixations survive, say, until the 
moment of litigation.48 
Oddly, Kim Seng seems to stand for exactly the opposite 
proposition yet indirectly cites to the article for support. Because 
of this, it is unclear where exactly courts looking to follow Kim 
Seng, or at least trying to interpret Kelley in the same way, should 
draw the line. If fixation requires something less than stability for 
the term of copyright but something more than the rapid 
degradation that characterizes perishable food, just how stable does 
a communicative medium need to be to qualify as a medium of 
45 Tech Guide: Storage Media Lifespans, ZDNET (Oct. 14, 2002), 
http://www.zdnet.com/tech-guide-storage-media-lifespans-1120269043. 
46 Kim Seng, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (citing to 2 Patry on Copyright § 
3:22). 
47 Douglas Lichtman, Copyright As A Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 
732 (2003). 
48 Id. 
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fixation?  
 
C.  A Look Toward the Future 
 
It remains to be seen whether other courts will follow the trail 
paved by Kim Seng and extend the notion raised in Kelley that 
authors simply cannot fix works in certain media. The intuitive 
allure of the idea is clear in both cases: how can you “fix” 
something that can change? But, as the Kelley court recognized, 
everything can and does change over time. Of course, categorical 
restrictions on media are heuristically useful as well; there is no 
need to determine whether a particular arrangement of plants or 
food is sufficiently permanent if no plants or food can be. But is 
this emerging approach really in line with congressional intent? 
And, as a policy matter, does it impose problematic restrictions? 
As discussed above, Congress intended to create a flexible 
requirement that could adapt to new technologies and art forms. 
The video game cases represented an effort by courts to 
accommodate this intent. But categorical rejection of certain media 
could potentially upend that accommodation.  
One issue that may be on the horizon involves a concept that 
computer scientists call “emergent behavior.” The concept 
encompasses unforeseen effects of designed programs and 
systems. More complex systems more frequently exhibit emergent 
behaviors.49 Artificial intelligence programs, extraordinarily 
complex and difficult to predict with certainty, often exhibit these 
types of behaviors.50 In fact, emergent behaviors may well be a 
key to producing artificial intelligence.51 A human can program an 
artificial intelligence, and that program would seem to be 
copyrightable as a form of software. But if that software is subject 
49 See generally Gerald E. Marsh, The Demystification of Emergent 
Behavior (2009), available at http://arxiv.org/abs/0907.1117. 
50 Pattie Maes, Behavior-Based Artificial Intelligence, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, 74 
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993). 
51 See, e.g., Rodney A. Brooks, A Robot that Walks: Emergent Behaviors 
from a Carefully Evolved Network, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, A.I. Memo 1091 (1989).  
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to emergent behaviors unforeseen by the author, has it really been 
encoded as a work? Moreover, is such a work permanent in the 
sense that it can resist “deterioration” from the author’s original 
vision long enough to serve as evidence of it? Aren’t these 
programs more akin to wildflowers in a garden than to simple 
programs like Defender?  
From a policy perspective, it would seem advantageous to 
society to incentivize creation of these sorts of works. Copyright 
law in general is usually justified as incentivizing production of 
expressive works, often for public consumption.52 But if the 
fixation requirement impedes copyright protection for work 
deemed important, this incentivization will be suboptimal at best. 
This problem may extend to artificial intelligence programs. It may 
also extend to conceptual art expressed through gardens or even 
food. If federal copyright law does not protect these sorts of works, 
the states may wish to step in, since the protection of unfixed 
works is not preempted by the Copyright Act.53  
While these concerns may not have been on the minds of the 
judges who decided Kelley and Kim Seng, judges looking to those 
cases as persuasive authority in the future would do well to keep 
the implications of those decisions in mind. If they do not, and 
especially if the courts further narrow the boundaries around media 
of fixation, the courts may ironically return copyright law to the 
place Congress left behind in 1976: confined to known media of 
expression in a continuously changing world. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The courts in Kelley—which pitted an intransigent artist 
against a cash-strapped municipal agency—and Kim Seng—which 
involved dubious claims and seemingly unfair competitive 
practices—may well have been looking for reasons to find a lack 
of copyright protection. But regardless of their intentions, the 
courts produced a new line of intriguing case law on fixation. In an 
ironic twist, the concept that Congress hoped would provide 
52 1 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:3 (2010). 
53 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:22 (2007). 
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flexibility for protection of expressive works in unknown future 
media may well prove a barrier to the protection, and therefore the 
incentivization, of such works. 
Lawyers and judges alike should be aware of the turn in 
reasoning represented by Kelley and Kim Seng. The idea of 
categorical medium restrictions provides fertile soil for novel 
arguments and efficient rulings. But blind judicial acceptance of 
the potentially tantalizing approach is dangerous. The implications 
of the new Kelley line threaten to corral fixation, and therefore 
copyright law, within fences established by history and intuition 
rather than effective policy and legislative intent. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 When challenging the copyrightability of a work in a new 
or unusual medium, consider whether that medium is 
inherently self-changing or so obviously impermanent as to 
call into question its suitability as a medium of fixation. 
 When arguing against such a fixation challenge, consider 
that both policy and legislative intent favor a flexible and 
accommodating fixation requirement. 
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